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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EDGAR RONALD PENDERVILLE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8053 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Responding to appellant's Statement of Facts, respond-
ent says: 
With exception to the reference to a sum of $1,500.00 
allegedly paid by appellant to counsel, said reference being, 
in our opinion, immaterial, we adopt what appellant has 
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said in his brief, pages 1 through 13, to the final reported 
answer to the court by Mr. Penderville, as being an ac-
curate account of the happenings between court, counsel 
and appellant on December 15th, 16th, 1952. As to what 
appellant said to or told his counsel on December 17th, 
1952, we are not informed from the record and, of course, 
we shall not attempt to interject allegation hors the record 
in rebuttal thereof. From the record of trial, it does ap-
pear that appellant did not again present his objection to 
the court on December 17th at a session in chambers im-
mediately preceding the trial or at any time thereafter (R. 
64). 
The record shows from the "Transcript of Proceed-
ings:" 
Aug. 1, 1952-Filed Complaint of Del Duncombe 
charging defendant with the crime of Murder in the 
first degree 
Aug. 1, 1952-Warrant of arrest issued 
Aug. 2, 1952-Warrant filed on return 
Aug. 2, 1952-Defendant present without coun-
sel. Defendant answered that Edgar Ronald Pender-
ville is his true and correct name. Complaint read. 
Defendant advised as to his right to counsel. On 
motion of defendant, court ordered arraignment con-
tin,ued to August 7 at 10:00 A. M. to enable defen-
dant to employ counsel. 
Aug. 7, 1952-Deft present with counsel Joe 
McCarthy. Deft answered that Edgar Ronald Pen-
derville is his true and correct name. Complaint 
read. Court ordered hearing set for Sept. 18, 1952 
at 10 :00 A. M. Deft. to be held without bail. 
Aug. 21, 1952-Filed Motion 
-
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Aug. 27, 1952-Defts. motion for State to furn-
ish certain statements, documents, reports, photo-
graphs, and names of witnesses was argued by re-
spective counsel and denied. 
Sept. 15, 1952-Deft's motion for a continuance 
was argued by deft's counsel and granted and Court 
ordered hearing cont'd to Oct. 28, '52'-10 A. M. 
Oct. 28, 1952-Deft. pr~sent with counsel for 
hearing. Joyce Richardson was sworn as reporter. 
Complaint read. Wm. Y. Tipton, James D. Anderson 
and Reed M. Langford were sworn and examined 
behalf State. States exhibits "A"-drawing, "B."-
7 photographs and "C"-11 photographs were 
marked. Dr. Maurice J. Taylor, Catherine Smith~ 
Dr. Lyman W. Condie, Dr. Adolph M. Nielson, Tom 
Coggle, Vern Coggle, Susan Eliason, Wm. J. Chris-
tensen, B. F. Ramano, A. J. Murray and D. F. Dun-
combe were sworn and examined behalf State. States 
exhibit "D'J-Bed spread, "E"-brassiere, "F"-
pad, "G"-pillow and case, "H"-smock, "I"-slip 
and "J"-sheet were marked. States exhibits A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J were offered and received 
in evidence. State rests 
Oct. 28, 1952-Court informed deft. of his right 
to make a statement not under oath. Deft. waived 
his right. Deft's. motion to dismiss complaint was 
argued by respective counsel and denied. Deft. rests. 
Court ordered defendant bound over to the District 
Court for trial on the charge set forth in the com-
plaint without bail (R. 2 and 3). 
App~llant's arraignment in the District Court was on 
the 6th day of December, 1952 (R. 7). 
To the witnesses: Adolph M. Neilsen, M. D. 
Dr. Neilsen, Salt Lake City physician, testified that he 
arrived at the Penderville apartment at approximately 
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eleven o'clock p. m. on July 30th (R. 82) ; that at that time 
he found the body of June Weiler Penderville there at the 
apartment (R. 82); that he found her to be dead (R. 83). 
The doctor then described the position, condition, etc., of 
the cadaver, observing that there was blood in the nostrils 
and mouth (R. 83); that he formed an opinion from his 
examination as to the cause of death, that in his opinion 
death occurred from internal violence or trauma to the 
head and that the injuries he observed on the neck, eyes, 
head and skull could not have been self-inflicted (R. 93, 
94); that the nose was broken (R. 83, 88) that it would 
take a fairly strong blow to cause such hemorrhaging as 
had occurred ( R. 95) ; and, that the cause of death seemed 
evident (R. 113). 
Lyman W. Condie, M. D. Witness-(R. 116) 
Dr. Condie testified that he was called to the Pender-
ville apartment on July 30th for the purpose of attending 
June Weiler Penderville in connection with the possibility · 
of her commitment to the Salt Lake County Hospital; that 
he arrived at or about 5:15 p. m. and departed at 6 o'clock 
p. m. ; that he administered seconal, a drug sedative, to Mrs. 
Penderville; that both Mr. and Mrs. Penderville decided 
that they did not want her to go-to the Salt Lake County 
Hospital (R. 118, 119). He observed at that time that 
Mrs. Penderville had some old contusions about the eyes 
and cheeks and jaw (R. 120). The doctor thereafter testi-
fied that Attorney William Christensen called him at 9 :35 
p. m. in the evening of the same day and that he again went 
to the Penderville apartment in response to said call, ar-
riving there at approximately 9:55 p. m. (R. 121); that, 
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as he entered the apartment Mr. Penderville said, "Hurry, 
I think she still has a pulse." Upon conducting an examin-
ation the doctor opined that, at that time, Mrs. Pender-
ville was dead (R. 121). Further testifying as to his ex-
amination of the body, he stated that the body had a dif-
ferent look than when he had last seen Mrs. Penderville 
alive at 6 o'clock p. m. (R. 121), and that the contusions 
about the eyes were considerably larger and the "* * * 
skin in that area was a dark purple" (R. 122); that there 
was blood in the nostrils and mouth (R. 123). On cross-
examination, Dr. Condie testified generally as to treatment 
and medications afforded Mrs. Penderville while she was 
under his care with emphasis mainly to barbituates and the 
cumulative effect thereof when taken with alcohol (R. 123-
128). Then, on re-opening for direct examination, the doc-
tor testified that he attended Mrs. Penderville on July 27th 
at which time he noted various contusions, and that she, 
Mrs. Penderville, said, in the presence of the appellant, 
"He hit me," (R. 130). It was the opinion of this witness, 
as was that of Dr. Neilsen (R. 93, 94), that the injuries 
and contusions he observed on the body of Mrs. Penderville 
at and after 9:15p.m. on July 30th, were not self-inflicted 
(R. 130). 
Susan Eliason, Witness-(R. 138) 
Miss Eliason testified that she heard a disturbance 
and noises coming from the vicinity of the Penderville 
apartment between the hours of 7 p. m. and 7 :25 p. m. 
(the witness left the premises at that hour but the noise 
had not ceased) on the 30th day of July; and that "I thought 
they were making a lot of noise, and it made me mad, so 
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I stamped my foot on the floor to quiet it" (R. 140). The 
witness knew there were some cars in front of the apart-
ment although she was not able to recall whether or not 
the Penderville car was one of them (R. 146). 
William J. Christensen, Witness-(R. 148) 
This witness testified that he received a call from the 
defendant at about fifteen minutes before 9 o'clock on the 
evening of July 30th (R. 149), and that responding to said 
call he went to the Penderville apartment arriving there 
at around 9 p. m. or shortly before that time (R. 148, 
149). That he remained at the apartment until approxi-
mately 1:45 o'clock a. m. of the morning of the 31st of 
July ( R. 150) . In addition, on direct examination, the wit-
ness described what he then observed concerning Mrs. Pen-
derville ; he did not then state whether she was alive or 
dead. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Christensen stated that upon 
seeing the lady lying on the floor, his curiousity was 
aroused (R. 151) ; that Mr. Penderville did not appear to 
be particularly upset at the time the witness arrived on 
the scene (R. 152) ; that he seemed perfectly rational, 
not alarmed or fearful (R. 153) ; that the lady was alive 
and breathing rather heavily (R. 153) ; that her condition 
changed while he was there, about forty-five minutes after 
other occurrences there, she discontinued breathing (R. 
154). Mr. Penderville noted the change of condition first 
and only then was he advised by Mr. Christensen to get a 
doctor right away (R. 155). To this point in the examina-
tion of the witness, there had been nothing elicited from 
this witness other than that the lady was lying on the floor 
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and that no examination was made .of her (R. 149), and 
nothing done pertaining to her with the sole exception of 
ministrations with an ice pack (R. 162) until after the 
arrival of Dr. Condie (R. 156, 164) ; the body was in the 
same condition at the time the doctor arrived as at the time 
the witness first arrived (R. 164). The objections by the 
State as to "hearsay" and as to "proper cross-examination" 
during the examination of the witness were sustained by 
the Court. 
G. J. Murray-Witness (R. 166) 
Mr. Murray testified that he was the caretaker for the 
apartments at 1012 Barbara Place (R. 166) ; that there 
were thirty-nine apartments together with from two to 
six motel rooms (R. 167). That he became acquainted 
with the defendant on or about the first day of July and 
that he rented Apartment No. 2 to the Pendervilles at that 
time (R. 167). He described the location of that apartment 
with relation to the office and the apartment which he 
occupied (R. 168). The witness testified as to voices or 
words he had heard emanating from the Penderville apart-
ment during the month of July, that Mr. Penderville's voice 
always seemed to be that of a demand of some kind and 
that he heard it, after the first two or three days, every 
day while they were there (R. 169, 170). This witness 
then testified that he was either in his apartment or around 
the building on the 30th day of July, all day (R. 170). He 
then stated that he was familiar with the Penderville's 
Cadillac automobile, that it was at the apartment all that 
day, parked at a certain place and in a certain manner and 
that it was still in the same place when the officers arrived 
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(R. 170, 171). That during the day he did not see the de-
fendant at any time and during the evening only when he 
saw the defendant at the phone (R. 171, 172). The witness 
testified that Mr. Penderville used the telephone numerous 
times from 5 p. m. on and fixed the time of five o'clock as 
being when he, the witness, went through the office to go 
to his apartment (R. 172) ; at five-thirty o'clock "Because 
I was eating my dinner" (R. 173) ; at seven-thirty because 
the witness was listening to the television (R. 173, 174, 
176, 177). The record does show some discrepancy in this 
witness's testimony at the trial, as to the time of the tele-
phone calls defendant made, with the witness's prior testi-
mony at the preliminary hearing (R. 174); however, he 
had given the matter more thought and concentration and 
he had not talked to anyone about it (R. 175). 
Delbert F. Duncombe-Witness 
Officer Duncombe testifi.ed that he was called to in-
vestigate at 1012 Barbara Place on the night of July 30, 
1952 (R. 177, 178); that he conducted the investigation 
and directed the taking of pictures (R. 179). The witness 
was fully examined as to his findings during the investiga-
tion and in the course thereof made reference to, and com-
mented on, the pictures he had directed be taken. Chemical 
analysis was not made of the spots or stains found within 
the apartment nor of those on the appellant's clothing. On 
voir dire the witness was asked by counsel for the defend-
ant: 
"Q. How can you tell an old blood spot from 
a new blood spot. 
"A. Well, they become dark and become hard, 
coagulated. 
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"Q. Would you repeat that? 
"A. They become dark in color and kind of co-
agulate, kind of,-I can't explain it to you. 
"Q. But when a blood spot has dried, assuming 
this is a blood spot, you can only tell the age of it by 
your experience? 
"A. Well, I would say that was somewhat 
right. However, in talking to Mr. Penderville, he 
alBo told me they were blood, * * *" (R. 181). 
Upon the completion of the further examination of this 
witness, the State rested (R. 200). 
Motions were then presented for the defense (a) to 
dismiss the case, (b) to dismiss the charge of first degree 
murder, (c) to reduce the charge to murder in the second 
degree, (d) to reduce the charge to voluntary manslaughter, 
all of which were denied. The court reserved to the defense 
the right to renew the motion to reduce the charge to murder 
in the second degree upon the completion of the evidence 
(R. 201, 202). 
The defense opened (R. 203). 
E. 'Lever I Barrett, M. D., Witness- (R. 203). 
The witness prbffered testimony to the effect that the 
decedent was a chronic alcoholic in 1949 (R. 204, 205) . 
Jack Tedrow, M. D., Witness-(R. 205) 
In the opinion of this witness, the decedent was a 
chronic alcoholic and addicted to the use of barbituates 
when he treated her in March and April of 1949 (R. 206). 
The doctor stated that alcohol and barbituates have a cumu-
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Iative effect and that both of them affect the central nerv-
ous system (R. 207). 
William D. O'Gorman, I\1. D., Witness- (R. 207) 
The decedent had been a patient of this doctor during 
the period from April to July, 1949 (R. 207). The doctor 
thought that a person addicted to the use of alcohol and 
the use of barbituates bleeds more easily than a person 
who is not; that one so addicted would be more apt to 
receive a fatal injury from a slighter blow than would a 
person not so addicted (R. 208, 209). The witness's re-
marks as to effect of combined use of alcohol and barbitu-
ates, quoted by appellant's counsel in their statement of 
facts, was stricken as being immaterial and irrelevant to 
the cause (R.' 208). The witness had never formed an 
opinion as to whether the deceased would bleed more easily 
than other persons (R. 210); he had made no tests as to 
clotting time (R. 211). 
Sidney E. Gilchrist, Witness- (R. 211) 
This witness stated that he was director of laboratories 
for the Salt Lake City ~ealth Department; that on or about 
July 31, he tested the urine of the deceased to determine 
alcoholic content. 
Barton G. Clay, Witness-(R. 215) 
Anna G. Robinson, Witness-(R. 220) 
Cleo Porter, Witness-(R. 223) 
Eva W. Shaw, Witness- (R. 232) 
Clay, Robinson, Porter and Shaw were employees of 
the Utah Liquor Commission and were called to establish 
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the fact that defendant purchased two-fifths of Davis 
County whiskey at State Store No. 3, Second. South and 
Second East, Salt Lake City, on July 30, 1952. Efforts to 
establish the exact or approximate time of the purchases 
failed. Miss Porter made one sale and Defense Exhibit 3 
indicates that -she was on duty July 30th from 3 :41 p. m. 
to 6:03 p. m. and from 6:40 p. m. to 11:12 p. m.; Shaw 
made the other sale and Defense Exhibit 5 shows her as 
having worked on July 30th from 12:29 p. m. to 4:04 p. 
m. and from 4 :32 p. m. to 7 :33 p. m. The numbers on the 
cash register tapes corresponding with the numbers on the 
sales cards show only that in each instance the purchases 
were made during the above shift hours. 
Fred M. Newson, Witness-(R. 234) 
The witness testified that appellant in the company 
of the deceased was in his place of business on July 30th 
of this year (1952) "* * * possibly between ten thirty 
and noon some time" (R. 235, 236). 
Delbert F. Duncombe, Witnesss-(R. 237) 
The officer, testifying as a witness for appellant, stated 
that during his investigation of the case he discovered a 
partially full bottle of Davis whiskey in the Penderville 
apartment. 
William J. Christensen, Witness-(R. 238) 
Called as a witness for defense, Christensen presumed 
that he was called to the Penderville apartment in a pro-
fessional capacity as an attorney and he testified that the 
subject matters of which he talked with defendant were 
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(a) "* * * my inquiry about what was the matter and 
about the lady on the floor" (R. 238) ; (b) "* * * in 
connection with some advice he wanted as to marriage of 
the lady being bigamous or not" (R. 239) ; (c) that he 
had no conversation "relating to the subject matter of this 
case" since the case did not exist then and there was no 
chance to talk about something that did not exist (R. 239); 
(d) concerning the subject of homicide but not until after 
the plain clothes detectives had arrived and had questioned 
appellant (R. 239, 240) . 
• 
Richard A. Call, M. D., Witness-(R. 240) 
The doctor, a pathologist, testified at length as to 
autopsies ; alcohol and seconal; Chemical analysis; hem-
orrhages ; trauma, black eyes; locomotion and loss of 
control of bodily functions; hemorrhages, petechial and 
subdural; hemorrhagic diseases; blood tests; liver func-
tions; blows-small, light and heavy; skull fractures; stains 
and spots; scratch marks and skin tests; blood types; age 
of blood stains ; rigor mortis and body coloration after 
death; bruises, chronic alcoholics and bleeding; hemo-
philiacs; the thickness of the average scalp and the age 
of bruises. As to the deceased and as to the State's photo-
graphic exhibits of the cadaver, the witness testified: 
"Q. You didn't know anything about June 
Weiler Penderville? 
"A. I heard the testimony. 
"Q. You didn't know whether or not she would 
bleed more readily than other people, do you? 
"A. As a specific case, no. 
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"Q. And that is because you haven't taken any 
tests or didn't treat her before she died. Isn't that 
true? 
"A. I didn't take any test, no. 
"Q. What is that? 
.. A. I did not take any tests. 
"Q. And the reason you can't tell about her as 
a specific individual is because you didn't take any 
tests? 
"A. If tests had been taken, it would have been 
able to determine that, though. 
"Q. Now, it isn't your testimony that the con-
dition of these eyes as you see it here is caused by 
some kind of make-up or something of that kind, is 
it? 
"A. No, that isn't my testimony, but photog-
raphy is notoriously deceiving. 
"Q. And, of course, all we can do is take the 
appearance of these photographs, Doctor, and does 
it look to you like the condition reflected by these 
was caused by trauma? 
"A. Well, given adequate photographs and an 
adequate examination, I could draw a much better 
conclusion. 
"Q. I am asking you from the photographs we 
have at hand, sir. Does that appear to you to have 
been caused by trauma? 
"A. I would again have to know if these were 
bruises or dried blood on the skin. The photograph 
in and of itself is not helpful in the determination 
of trauma. 
"Q. Your testimony then is that from looking 
at those pictures that you are unable to express an 
opinion and tell us whether or not this body was 
subjected to any trauma. Is that your testimony? 
"A. No. 
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"Q. Well, what is it then? 
"A. 1 must qualify that a little bit and say if 
the photographs are a true representation, then J 
would agree that they do represent trauma. 
"Q. And assuming that an individual-and as-
suming again that they truly represent the condition 
which existed, sir, and further assuming that the 
scalp showed bruises and contusions and was thick-
ened up to 1.3 centimeters, it looks like, in a few 
areas due to the presence of edema and contusions, 
would you say that such trauma could cause a mas-
sive subdural hematoma? 
"A. It is possible. 
· "Q. And from just taking the appearance of 
the body there and assuming again the condition of 
the scalp that I have indicated, that is the most 
likely thing which would cause a subdural or a mas-
sive subdural hematoma if it were present in the 
body which is indicated in the pictures? 
"A. That is correct" (R. 266, 267, 268). 
Edgar Ronald Penderville, Defendant-(R. 271-
286) 
Defendant, in response to questioning as to his where-
abouts between approximately six thirty and seven thirty 
on the evening of July 30th, 1952, testified: 
"A. I left the apartment I should judge ap-
proximately six forty-five. I drove downtown, went 
to the liquor store at Second So11th and Second East, 
made a purchase, and from there I drove west on 
Second South and parked between First and-be-
tween State and Second East, State and Second East 
-let's see-l'm not too familiar-Main and State 
is where I parked and went across the street and 
had something to eat. 
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"Q. Do you recall the name of the place where 
you ate? 
"A. I'm not sure, but I believe that it's known 
as the Pony Express Cafe. 
"Q. After you finished eating, what did you 
do? 
"A. I returned to the car and drove home" ( R. 
272). 
Further testifying, he said: that when he arrived home 
he found his wife lying on the floor along the wall; that 
he lifted her out as best he could and her nose was bleed-
ing; that he went to the bathroom and rinsed out a wash 
cloth in cold water, bathed her face, went back and rinsed 
the wash cloth out again and folded it over her forehead 
(R. 272). Thereafter, he prepared an ice pack, noted her 
right eye was swollen and he got the bed spread from the 
bed and put it over her (R. 272, 273) . Then he said, "I 
imagine ten or fifteen minutes after that I went down stairs 
and called Mr. Christensen" (R. 273). 
"Q. Do you know what time you made the 
phone call for Mr. Christensen? 
"A. No, I can't say precisely what time it was. 
It was some time I imagine between quarter of 
eight and quarter after eight. I have no way of 
knowing exactly what time it was" (R. 273). 
Mr. Christensen had testified that he received a call 
from appellant at about fifteen minutes before nine o'clock 
on the evening of July 30th (R. 149). 
From the testimony as supported by the exhibits, it 
appears that appellant did purchase two fifths of Davis 
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County whiskey at State Store No. 3 on July 30th, 1952; 
there remains a question as to the time of day for each 
purchase (R. 287). Appellant was "not particularly" alarm-
ed to find the deceased on the floor of the apartment (R. 
288). 
Defendant and appellant here on cross-examination 
testified: 
"Q. Doctor Condie left your place about six 
o'clock that night, didn't he? 
"A. I believe it was shortly after six, yes sir. 
"Q. And do you know what time you left? 
"A. I know it was after six because Doctor 
Condie looked at his watch at one time while we 
were talking in the living room and said, 'it is after 
six o'clock. I have got to get home.' 
"Q. Well, but in connection with your leaving 
the place, it could have been before six thirty that 
you left. Isn't that true? 
"A. I don't believe it was before six thirty, no. 
"Q. Could it have been six thirty? 
"A. It could have been-I guess it could have 
been six thirty, but I don't believe it was. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, you told the officers 
that you had been gone about three quarters of an 
hour. Is that how long you were gone? 
"A. That would be my estimate" (R. 288, 289). 
Testifying as to the deceased the witness said: 
"Q. When you left, where was June? 
"A. June was on the bed. 
"Q. Asleep ? 
"A. Asleep. 
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"Q. And then when you returned, you say 
that she was out of bed? 
"A. She was out of bed, yes" (R. 290). 
And, 
"Q. She was bleeding from the nose, wasn't 
she, when you got back? 
"A. Yes, she was. 
"Q. She was bleeding from the mouth when 
you got back? 
"A. No, she wasn't. 
"Q. Was there any blood in her mouth? 
"A. Not that I noticed. 
"Q. Did you ever at any time during that even-
ing notice any blood in her mouth? 
"A. No, I didn't" ( R. 291). 
Further, 
"Q. And you say when you came back and 
you looked at this body or this-June there-that 
you were not particularly concerned. Is that right? 
"A. Not at the time, no. 
"Q. And you didn't call a doctor? 
"A. Not right then, no. 
"Q. The first person that you called was a 
lawyer? 
"A. That's right" (R. 292). 
Then, 
"* * * after you returned, what was the 
first phone call you made? 
"A. I called Mr. Christensen. 
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"Q. And you estimate that time as being what? 
"A. I should say it was probably around eight 
or eight fifteen. 
"Q. And you called him in connection with 
the condition of June? 
"A. Not particularly" (R. 292). 
Also, 
"Q. Now, you say that you-during this period 
that Mr. Christensen was there June was breathing 
very heavily, wasn't she? 
"A. I wouldn't say very heavily. I would say 
she was breathing audibly. 
"Q. And it didn't particularly attract your at-
tention the way she was breathing during this per-
iod of time? 
"A. No. I was conscious of it, but it didn't 
attract my attention. 
"Q. And then all of a sudden she stopped 
breathing. Is that it? 
"A. I don't know whether it was all of a sud-
den. 
"Q. Were you paying any attention to her? 
"A. No. At that particular time I believe my 
back was turned. 
"Q. And she was there prone on the floor? 
"A. She was lying on her back, yes. 
"Q. Pillow under her at all? 
"A. No" (R. 293, 294). 
Finally, 
"Q. And you knew that she had been given sed-
atives by the doctor? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
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"Q. And that they had put her to sleep? 
"A. Right" (R. 295). 
Defendant on redirect examination testified : 
"Q. Referring again to this liquor, I believe 
-was the first fifth that you bought drunk by the 
time you went downtown for the second fifth? 
"A. It was gone. 
"Q. How much liquor out of that bottle did 
you drink? 
"A. I had two mixed drinks, whiskey sours. 
"Q. Now, out of the second bottle, did you have 
any drinks out of that? 
"A. I had some out of that after the inquisi-
tion started. 
"Q. Did you have-were you the only one that 
had a drink-
"A. As far as I know. 
"Q. -out of that bottle? 
"A. As far as I know. It was open and there. 
I think it was opened about-well, it was after the 
officers came that it was opened. I couldn't say the 
time" (R. 295). 
And, 
"Q. Did you ever have a serious head injury? 
"A. Yes. I have had a fractured skull. 
"Q. When did you have this skull fracture? 
"A. March 1, 1951. 
"Q. Since that time have you noticed any dif-
ference in your capacity to hold liquor? 
"A. Definitely. 
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"Q. In what respect? 
"A. I can't take as much. 
"Q. You can't take as much before you get 
drunk? 
"A. In my opinion I don't get drunk" (R. 296). 
The witness had taken some paraldehyde during an 
interview cond11:cted by the officers on July 31st, 1952, and 
attributes to this his loss of memory as to what was then 
said. 
Elizabeth Ross, Witness-(R. 274). 
The witness, called by the State, produced and 
identified medical records from the files of the Latter-Day 
Saints Hospital, Salt Lake City, Utah, pertaining to the 
deceased. 
Maurice J. Taylor, M. D., Witness-(R. 276). 
The witness was called by the State, out of order of 
trial, and testified of intermittant treatment afforded the 
deceased by him from the month of August, 1949, through 
June 3, 1952. The doctor testified as to tests conducted as 
late as May and June of 1952 which did not indicate that 
the deceased had a tendancy to bleed easily (R. 279); that 
alcoholism in and of itself is not a cause of increased bleed-
ing in the absence of severe liver damage (R. 279, 280). 
The witness testified further as to an examination of the 
deceased at the Newhouse Hotel on May 13, 1952 and as 
to his findings thereon. On cross-examination the witness 
stated that the deceased was not drunk all the time (R. 
285) ; that for a period of some eighteen months, during 
1949 and 1951, she was gainfully employed, not malnour-
ished, and the picture of health (R. 286), that as late as 
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June 3rd, 1952, the deceased was in quite good state of 
physical health (R. 286). 
Camilla M. Anderson, Psychiatrist, Witness-
(R. 298). 
The witness testified she had examined the defendant 
and that she was of the opinion that he had a limited capac-
ity for alcohol and as to the manner in which he might be 
affected by the taking of an ounce of paraldehyde. That 
a person in an amnesic state produced from the taking of 
paraldehyde would tend to tell the truth. 
Delbert F. Duncombe, Witness-(R. 305). 
Witness, a police officer, called by the State as a re-
buttal witn'ess, testified as to a conversation with defendant 
had on July 31st, 1952, during which defendant stated in 
substance and effect that he returned to the apartment 
about three quarters of an hour after having left there and 
that that would make it at about seven or seven fifteen 
o'clock; that, during the same conversation, defendant 
stated that he was angry upon entering the apartment and 
finding the deceased not in bed. The officer stated that de-
fendant had been given some paraldehyde. On cross-ex-
amination, this witness stated that at the time of question-
ing the defendant was guessing at the time he left the 
apartment or judging it by the time the doctor departed; 
that "he stated that the doctor left, and he left immediately, 
afterwards" (R. 306). Officer Duncombe further testified 
as to how the defendant reacted after taking the paralde-
hyde, he had previously testified that the paraldehyde was 
taken by defendant after the herein referred to statements 
of defendant at the interview (R. 306). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AS GUARAN-
TEED AND PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SEC-
TION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
AND SECTION 77-1-8, SUBPARAGRAPH 1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, WERE 
NEVER VIOLATED NOR WAS DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW DENIED APPELLANT IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING ANY ONE OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING 
MOTIONS MADE BY DEFENDANT: 
(a) Motion to Dismiss the Action at the Close of 
the State's Case and Renewed at the Close of 
Defendant's Case (R. 200, 309). 
(b) Motion to Dismiss the Charge of First Degree 
Murder at the Close of the State's Case and 
Renewed at the Close of Defendant's Case (R. 
200, 309). 
(c) Motion to Reduce the Charge to Voluntary 
Manslaughter Made at the Close of the State's 
Case (R. 202). 
(d) The Verdict is Contrary to the Law and the 
Evidence, as- Raised in Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial (R. 50-66). 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM 
J. CHRISTENSEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE 
CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH DEFEND-
ANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE 
1NAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PEN-
DERVILLE APARTMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AS GUARAN-
TEED AND PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SEC-
TION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
AND SECTION 77-1-8, SUBPARAGRAPH 1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, WERE 
NEVER VIOLATED NOR WAS DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW DENIED APPELLANT IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
"Strategy may not be resorted to in courts of justice 
as is the case in war." Thus, this Court has spoken. Van 
Cott et al., v. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 291, 178 P. 2d 42. 
The "Transcript of Proceedings" speaks for itself. 
Defendant was charged with the crime of murder in the 
first degree on August 1st, 1952, and was not finally 
arraigned in the District Court until the 6th day · of De-
cember, 1952. Continuances were had on motion of defend-
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ant and defendant was, in fact, continuously represented by 
counsel from and after August 2nd, 1952. It may not be 
said that defendant had insufficient time to prepare for 
trial; nor can it be successfully contended that he was denied 
the right to defend in person. 
In the conduct of a criminal, the same as in a civil 
jury trial, much ought necessarily be left to the good sense 
and judgment of the judge. It is his duty to exercise a 
sound discretion in all matters appertaining to the orderly 
progress of the trial and during all stages of the proceeding 
as well, and his action should not be interfered with unless 
there is a clear abuse of discretion. 
Defendant now contends that he was denied the right 
to represent himself. The primary question is,. therefore, 
did he want to do just that. We think not. In the reported 
transcript of the discussion had between Judge Ellett and 
the defendant on the day preceding the trial, defendant 
said: 
"* * * and as of now, I don't have one red 
penny with which to employ another attorney, and 
I won't have until the first of the month. However 
I think I can get over that hurdle" (R. 321). * * * 
Then: 
"The Court: Well, do you want me to appoint 
a lawyer for you? 
"Mr. Penderville : I think I can make arrange-
ments, or I should like after this incident-! should 
certainly 'like to see three or four attorneys. 
"The Court: I'm not going to do that. I will 
tell you, because I think you are stalling on me, I 
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will appoint a lawyer if you want to, or you can go 
ahead with Mr. McCarthy, and it is immaterial to 
me which you do" (R. 325). 
True, the record thereafter shows that defendant said 
he did not want Mr. McCarthy and it shows also that the 
court proceeded to appoint him regardless of that fact. 
However, the truth is that defendant did not seek to defend 
himself in person and it is apparent from all of the dis-
cussion had that the court understood correctly that what 
defendant actually desired was a further continuance. The 
court's ruling was correct; see United States v. Maurice 
Alvin Gutterman, 147 F. 2d 540, 157 A. L. R. 1221, (1945); 
Annotated 1225. That court, confronted with a similar 
if not identical problem, there said: 
"As for the claim that the court unlawfully de-
clined to dismiss the attorney who had been assigned 
to defend him and was not shown to be unfaithful 
or incompetent, it is in substance the same as the 
contention that we held to be unfounded in United 
States v. Mitchell (2 Cir.) 147 F. (2d) 1006, and 
ld. (2 Cir.) 138 F. (2d) 831. 
"There we had to deal with a defendant's con-
tention that he was seeking to discharge his attorney 
merely in order to exercise his right to conduct his 
own defense, just as we have to do here. In neither 
case did it appear that the defendant was really seek-
ing to take over the personal conduct of his defense 
or that he was doing more than to claim the privi-
lege of changing his counsel because he did not ap-
prove of the latter's judgment. To yield to such a 
request where the defendant has not made it clear 
that he really wished to conduct the defense in pro-
pria persona gives far too great a chance to delay 
trials and otherwise embarrass effective prosecution 
of crime." 
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In their brief, counsel for appellant say: 
"As far as the record is concerned defendant 
had never been involved in a felony prosecution. 
This was an entirely new experience for him. Can 
there be any greater prejudice shown than forcing 
a defendant to trial with an attorney in whom he 
has no confidence?" 
We wonder if forcing him to defend himself, he being 
so uns~illed in such matters and totally unlearned in the 
law, would not have prejudiced his cause much more? We 
think that the court was acting within its sound discretion 
and that the record reveals a solicitude on the part of the 
court for the cause of appellant's defense. 
Where a solicitous trial judge advised a defendant 
thusly: 
"I think, as a matter of advice to the defendant 
and for the protection of his rights, that this case 
involves and will involve expert testimony; matters 
that require more or less technical knowledge; also 
technical knowledge on the part of counsel as to the 
character of evidence, propounding of questions put 
to expert witnesses; that requires a technical knowl-
edge as to the manner of presenting such testimony 
in court; that no person who is not familiar and 
understands the propounding of those questions and 
examining the experts is fully competent to repre-
sent the defendant, unless it is handled by counsel 
who are familiar with that class of testimony to 
some extent at least. Another thing that I want to 
call to the defendant's attention is that if he has 
counsel he has the privilege to request his counsel to 
ask any question that he may desire him to ask of 
any witness in the case, by communicating that 
question to his counsel and his counsel putting the 
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question to the witness, and if the question is a 
proper one or one that is relevant to the issues in 
the case, I believe that his counsel would and should 
present the question to the witness and he would ob-
tain all the results that he would obtain by putting 
the question directly to the witness himself in per-
son." 
Thereafter, and despite such advice, the defendant 
therein elected to personally conduct his own defense; on 
appeal it was contended that the court's attitude and ruling 
on the matter deprived the appellant of a constitutional 
right to appear and defend in person and with counsel. 
The appellate court found such contention to be without 
merit. People v. Northcott, (Cal. 1930) 289 P. 634. In 
that case the defendant intended to, elected to, and did 
conduct his own case and the matter as to the right to a 
continuance was not an issue. 
The question of whether a continuance should be 
granted or not rests within the discretion of the trial court 
and will ordinarily not be reviewed : 
State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447. 
State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071. 
State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563. 
State v. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P. 2d 692. 
State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104. 
State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P. 2d 112. 
And, the refusal of a continuance will not be deemed 
error unless there has been a plain abuse of discretion: 
State v. Haworth, 24 Utah 398, 68 Pac. 165. 
State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 Pac. 497. 
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State v. Riley, 41 Utah 225, 126 Pac. 294. 
State v. Cano, supra. 
State v. Fairclough, supra. 
State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750. 
See generally Decennial Digests, Criminal Law, 
. Key No. 586 and Key No. 1151. 
In the case of State v. Cano, supra, the time between 
the preliminary hearing and the trial was only a little 
more than thirty days ; in the instant case, the offense 
charged was committed on the 30th day of July; the de-
fendant was arraigned on August 2nd; thereafter successive 
continuances were upon defendant's motion granted to Aug-
ust 7th, September 18th, and finally October 28th, in the 
year 1952. Finally on the 17th day of December, 1952, the 
trial commenced. The court said, in the Cano case, supra, 
that it would be a travesty of justice to reverse a judgment 
merely because one charged with a grave offense was speed-
ily tried, and upon such trial convicted. Defendant here 
complains of the "lower court's opinion" that defendant 
was taking too long to prepare his defense. Section 77-24-
"d I 18, U. C. A. 1953, prov1 es: 
"After his plea, the defendant shall be entitled 
to at least two days to prepare for trial, but the time 
of the trial shall not be postponed for a longer time 
than the court may deem imperative." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING ANY ONE OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING 
MOTIONS MADE BY DEFENDANT: 
(a) Motion to Dismiss the Action at the Close of 
the State's Case and Renewed at the Close of 
Defendant's Case (R. 200, 309). 
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(b) Motion to Dismiss the Charge of First Degree 
Murder at the Close of the State's Case and 
Renewed at the Close of Defendant's Case (R. 
200, 309). 
(c) Motion to Reduce the Charge to Voluntary 
Manslaughter Made at the Close of the State's 
Case (R. 202). 
(d) The Verdict is Contrary to the Law and the 
Evidence, as Raised in Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial (R. 50-66). 
Counsel for appellant says: 
"We direct the following argument to all of the 
foregoing motions. There is not a scintilla of evi-
dence which directly or indirectly justifies the con-
clusion that defendant was the perpetrator of the 
injuries sustained by the deceased on the 30th day of 
July, 1952." 
We submit that there was much more than a "scintilla" 
of evidence both direct and indirect which fully justified 
the jury (triers of the fact) to unanimously find that the 
defendant inflicted the injuries causing death. We contend 
further that these injuries could not have been self inflicted; 
this contention is irrevocably sustained by the expert medi-
cal testimony adduced during the trial. We direct the 
Court to the testimony of Adolph M. Neilsen, M. D., "the 
iniuries he observed on the neck; eyes, head and skull could 
not have been self inflicted" (R. 93-94); Lyman W. Condie, 
M. D., "the iniuries and contusions he observed on the body. 
of Mrs. Penderville at and after, 9:15 p. m. on July 30th,. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
were not self inflicted" (R. 130) ; there is no evidence the 
injuries were self inflicted, or could have been self inflicted, 
nor do the exhibits so indicate. Counsel interposes, and 
contends, through some twenty pages of their brief, their 
own theories on how the injuries could have been inflicted 
and some of their theories are indeed not lacking in in-
genuity. We think this argumentative approach would be 
proper for presentation to the jury but that it has little, 
if any, value or merit at this stage of the proceedings. It 
would not be material for the respondent here to advance 
a theory independent of the record. We are certain that 
this Court will draw its conclusions from the contents of 
the record. 
To the motions and their merit. The motions com-
plained of were made and disposed of as follows : 
Record, page 200-202 
"Mr. McCarthy: Comes now the defendant and 
moves the court to dismiss the charge of first degree 
murder for the reason that the prosecution has failed 
to establish a prima facie case, in that there is no 
showing of a criminal connection between the de-
fendant and the charge, nor is there proof of the 
corpus delicti. The evidence is inadequate to fix the 
cause of death. There is no connection showing that 
the defendant did the act. 
"The Court: Well, I think there is a jury ques-
tion here. The defendant was with the deceased so 
far as the evidence goes-I think the jury now 
could say he was with her all the time, and the evi-
dence of the doctors is that she died, received her 
death as a result of some trauma to the head, and I 
believe that the jury could find that this defendant 
was the cause of her death. 
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"Mr. McCarthy: Your Honor, I see nothing in 
the testimony that would rule out the possibility of 
an accidental death, nor is there anything to di-
rectly connect the defendant with the place in which 
the charged crime took place except negative testi-
mony that no one saw him elsewhere, which does not 
place the defendant on the scene at the time the 
. crime is charged to have been committed. 
"The Court: He's with her at the last anyone 
saw her, and the first anyone saw her thereafter 
he was with her. I think there is a jury question 
involved. The n;totion will be denied. 
"Mr. McCarthy: Now, Your Honor, I move to 
dismiss the allegation of first degree murder and 
ask that the charge on the present evidence be re-
duced to second degree murder because there is no 
showing of premeditation, plan, design, or anything 
else. 
"The Court: Do you want to be heard on that? 
"Mr. Roberts : Yes. I think there is, Your 
Honor, I think the testimony indicates that this 
woman was beaten and battered in the head. N um-
erous blows would have had to have caused the con-
dition which appears on her scalp, on her eyes, and 
the rest of her head and on the neck, and certainly 
such a beating-evidence of such a beating would 
indicate that the person who did it was intending 
to cause the death. 
"The Court: Let me ask, Mr. Roberts-you 
don't need to take this. 
" (Discussion) 
"The Court: The motion at this time will be 
denied. You may have the right to renew it upon 
the completion of the evidence if you desire. 
"Mr. McCarthy: I would like to go one further 
and move that the charge be reduced to voluntary 
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manslaughter because there is a failure to show in-
tent to kill. 
"The Court: That motion, of course, would have 
been taken care of-
"Mr. McCarthy : On the denial. 
"The Court : Of the first one, yes, and it is de-
nied." 
Record, page 309 
"The Court : We are out of the presence of the 
jury and in the presence of the defendant and coun-
sel. You may make such motions as you desire, Mr. 
McCarthy. 
''Mr. McCarthy: Thank you, sir. Comes now 
the defendant and moves the court to dismiss the 
entire charge for failure of the State to prove the 
case. 
"The Court : That motion will be denied. 
"Mr. McCarthy: Comes now the defendant and 
moves the court to dismiss the charge of first de-
gree murder for the reason that no premeditation 
has been proved. 
"The Court : I want to hear you on that. How 
are you going to defend that? 
"(Argument by Mr. Roberts) 
"The Court : I will deny your motion and let 
him argue it and see if they believe it." * * * 
A motion to dismiss the charge "is properly denied as 
where, according to various statements of the rule, the 
evidence is sufficient to authorize conviction; where there 
is substantial evidence to support a conviction, even though 
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a conviction based thereon would be regarded as flagrantly 
against the evidence; where there is any legal evidence, 
however slight or weak and inconclusive, tending reason-
ably to show, or affording an inference of, guilt, or from 
which the jury can legitimately deduce either of two con-
clusions; where the evidence of a material nature is con-
flicting, or presents a case for the jury, or is such that 
reasonable minds might differ as to accused's guilt; where 
the evidence tends to show the commission of the offense 
charged and the connection of accused therewith, * * * 
or is sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption of 
innocence, and to require accused to produce evidence in 
his own behalf, or is such that, if believed by the jury, it 
would support an inference or finding of guilt." 23 C. J. 
S., Criminal Law, Section 1145 (3), page 665, et. seq., 
and cases there cited. 
Commencing now with page 52 of Brief of Appellant, 
and with the above rules in mind, permit us to analyze 
(as we read them) the allegation, contention and conclu-
sion of counsel for defendant as to what the record shows. 
Dr. Condie was with the defendant and the now deceased 
at their apartment between the approximate hours of 5:15 
and 6:00 o'clock p. m. on the 30th day of July, 1952; he 
consulted with them both and examined (at least by ob-
servation) and administered to Mrs. Penderville (R. 118, 
119, 120); the dose of seconal which he gave her would 
put an average individual to sleep without question (R. 
120). When the doctor saw Mrs. Penderville next, at ap-
proximately 9:55p.m. on the same date, she was dead (R. 
121). He had been re-called to the apartment by an at-
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torney, William Christens~n, and upon entering he was 
told by defendant to "Hurry, I think she still has a pulse" 
(R. 121). The body of Mrs. Penderville now had a different 
look than it had had when he observed her when he last 
saw her alive at 6 o'clock p. m. and coupled with the 
abrasions and contusions thereon, there was blood in the 
nostrils and mouth (R. 123). The State's photo exhibits 
clearly show the extent of the abrasions, contusions and 
injuries inflicted upon the body of Mrs. Penderville. Some-
thing gruesome and most unpleasant certainly happened 
to her between the time of this physician's visits, i.e., 6 
o'clock and 9:55 p. m. Since the defendant was with the 
deceased the last anyone saw her and the first anyone saw 
her thereafter, the evidence so far adduced was sufficient 
to overcome prima facie the presumption of innocence and 
to require defendant to produce evidence in his own behalf. 
The witness, Dr. Condie, on cross examination testified 
that he attended the deceased on July 27, 1952, (three days 
prior to her demise) (R. 123, 124) ; on redirect examina-
tion the witness testified as to a conversation with the de-
ceased on said July 27th during which various contusions 
she had were being discussed, and she said "He hit me;" 
to which defendant replied, "Oh, you were drunk and 
stumbling about the room." Then while the doctor's ex-
amination continued and when defendant had left the room 
deceased again said to this witness, "He did too hit me" 
(R. 130). Is this evidence, such as, if believed by the jury, 
would support an inference of guilt? 
Counsel for defendant accepts the statements of the 
witness, Susan Eliason, to be true and admits that some-
thing occurred in the Penderville apartment between 7 :00 
and 7:25 o'clock p. m. The witness did not know when 
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these noises or the disturbance ceased, it probably lasted 
after 7 :25 o'clock but that is the time she left the building 
and as long as she heard it (R. 140, 141). From the evi-
dence so far, we, at this point, know something happened 
to the deceased between the hours of 6:00 and 9:55 p. m. 
and we know that at least between 7:00 and 7:25 p. m., 
there was a discernable disturbance within the Penderville 
apartment. The jury could legitimately deduce from this 
testimony, coupled with the later testimony of defendant, 
either of two conclusions; the defendant was in the apart-
ment or the defendant was not in the apartment at the time 
the sounds described by this witness emanated therefrom. 
Abandoning now the sequence of witnesses at the trial, 
we go to the testimony of defendant as did appellant. 
The defendant advances an alibi. He accounts for his 
time as follows : 
"Q. Calling your attention to the 30th of July 
of this year, during the time interval between ap-
proximately six thirty and seven thirty of that even-
ing, can you tell us where you were? 
"A. I left the apartment I should judge ap-
proximately six forty-five. I drove downtown, went 
· to the liquor store at Second South and Second East, 
made a purchase, and from there I drove west on 
Second South and parked between First and-be-
tween State and Second East, State and Second East 
-let's see-I'm not too familiar-Main and State is 
where I parked and went across the street and had 
something to eat. 
"Q. Do you recall the name of the place where 
you ate? 
"A. I am not sure, but I believe that it's known 
as the Pony Express Cafe. 
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"Q. After you finished eating, what did you 
do? 
"A. I returned to the car and drove home" (R. 
272). 
On direct examination the defendant. did not testify 
as to the hour of his return to the apartment. On cross. 
examination, he believed that it was shortly after six that 
he had left the apartment (R. 288) ; he did not believe that 
it was before six-thirty (R. 289). It was his estimate that 
he was gone about three quarters of an hour (R. 289) . Dr. 
Condie had testified that he had left the Penderville apart-
ment at six o'clock (R. 120, 121). Defendant said he knew 
it was after six because the doctor looked at his watch and 
said, "it is after six o'clock, I have got to get home" (R. 
288). Now, pinpointing time, if it be conceded that defend-
ant left "shortly after six" and was gone about forty-five 
minutes, it must have been somewhere near the hour of 
seven when he returned. The disturbance was heard be-
tween seven and seven twenty..;five and probably continued 
thereafter; we join with appellant's counsel and accept the 
testimony of Susan Eliason as being true. Conceding, for 
the sake of argument, but not admitting, we take the hour 
of six forty-five as the time of defendant's departure-the 
hour most favorable to defendant's cause and the one for 
which he himself claims-then, again taking his accounting 
of time-he would have returned to the apartment at seven-
thirty. Only five minutes after Susan Eliason departed, 
· and the disturbance not hav~ng then ended. Conceivable, 
but not probable, as we shall now see. Defendant has now 
been heard to say that he arrived home at seven-thirty 
o'clock; then he says that on his return he found his wife 
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lying on the floor along the wall and that he administered 
to her by bathing her face, preparing an ice pack and plac-
ing the bed spread over her. Then, "I imagine ten or 
fifteen minutes after that I went downstairs and called 
Mr. Christensen" (R. 273). That, says the defendant, was 
sometime between a quarter of eight and a quarter after 
eight! But, Mr. Christensen says he received the call 
about fifteen minutes before nine o'clock and that he ar-
rived at the apartment at around nine p. m., or shortly be-
fore that time (R. 148, 149). Dr. Condie returned to the 
apartment at nine fifty-five. We know that something 
happened to the deceased between the hours of 6 o'clock 
and 9:55 p. m.; we know that it most probably happened 
between 7 o'clock and 7:25 o'clock and thereafter. It ap-
pears to have happened and was over with before Lawyer 
Christensen arrived on the scene at 9 o'clock or shortly 
thereafter. We are sure that it was over with before 9:55 
when Dr. Condie returned. What we do not know is where 
was the defendant, accepting all of his testimony but again 
not conceding the truth thereof, between a quarter of eight 
or eight-fifteen when he said he called Christensen and 
eight forty-five when Christensen said he was called. Could 
the second bottle of whiskey have been purchased sometime 
then? Could the defendant, from all of the evidence, direct, 
indirect and circumstantial, have left the apartment after 
seven-thirty and returned sometime before eight forty-five? 
Is there evidence of a material nature conflicting, so as to 
present a case for the jury, and such upon which reason-
able minds might differ as to accused's guilt? We do not 
hesitate to answer in the affirmative! 
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Possibly we need go on. The defendant says that when 
he left the apartment the deceased was on the . bed and 
asleep (R. 290). Dr. Condie had testified that he had ad-
ministered to the deceased seconal in an amount that would 
put an average individual to sleep without question (R. 
290). The drug was administered during the doctor's first 
visit and when he departed the deceased was evidently yet 
awake, that was around six o'clock. Defendant says he left 
the apartment sometime between shortly after six o'clock 
and, again giving defendant the advantage, six forty-five 
o'clock. If deceased was drugged and asleep at six forty-
five o'clock, what could have awakened her before the hour 
of seven o'clock? Nowhere has it been made to appear that 
anyone other than the defendant was seen at or near the 
apartment of the deceased at or about the time deceased 
sustained her injuries. Therefore, the jury was called upon 
to adopt one of two premises; either the defendant inflicted 
upon deceased her injuries, or they were self-inflicted. The 
medical evidence was conclusive that those injuries could 
not have been self-inflicted (R. 93, 94 and 130). There was 
legal evidence, however slight or weak or inconclusive, tend-
ing reasonably to show, or affording an inference of, guilt, 
from which the jury could legitimately have deduced either 
of these two conclusions. In such case the motion to dismiss 
was properly denied. 
The defendant says that the deceased was bleeding 
from the nose when he returned and administered to her 
but that she was not bleeding from the mouth and that at 
no time during the evening did he notice any blood in her 
mouth (R. 291). The testimony of both Dr. Neilsen and 
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Dr. Condie was that there was blood in the nostrils and 
mouth (R. 83, 123). Here was evidence of a material 
nature which was conflicting! Officer Duncombe was in-
terrogated as to his knowledge of the age of the blood spots 
and admitted that he could only tell from experience, how-
ever, the defendant knew the spots were blood and he told 
the officer so (R. 181). To have known so, defendant must 
have seen these spots made. Is that substantial evidence to 
support a conviction, even though a conviction based there-
on would be regarded as flagrantly against the evidence? 
Is it evidence tending to show the commission of the of-
fense charged and the connection of the accused therewith? 
Not one but every test as to the proper denial of a motion 
to dismiss has been, from the record in this case, squarely 
met. When such competent evidence appears in the record, 
there can be no error in failing to direct a verdict of 
acquittal. State v. Peterson, (Utah 1952) 240 P. 2d 504. 
If the court is dissatisfied with the weight and credibility 
of the evidence, he may afterwards, upon that ground, set 
aside the verdict and grant a new trial, but such is no 
grounds for directing an acquittal. State v. Lewellyn, 
71 Utah 331, 266 P. 261. The rule applicable when a motion 
to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
was laid down by this Court in State v. '.(_hatcher, 108 Utah 
63, 157 P. 2d 258, as follows : 
"The rule which must be applied upon a motion 
to dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable in-
ferences are to be taken in favor of the state, and 
only if the record itself reveals that no reasonable 
man could draw an inference of guilt therefrom is 
the trial court justified in taking the case from the 
jury." 
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In applying the foregoing rule in this case, the tria 
court could properly have done only what it did do i1 
denying the motion to dismiss. 
Appellant points to the testimony of Burton G. Clay 
Anna G. Robinson, Cleo \Porter and Eva W. Shaw am 
claims for this that it corroborates defendant's testimony 
Nothing more was adduced from these witnesses other thar 
the nature and scope of their employment, shift hours anc 
the sale of two bottles of Davis County whiskey apparent!~ 
to the defendant during the time the liquor store was opeiJ 
on July 30, 1952. The testimony of Anna G. Robinson went 
for naught (R. 222). The time of the purchases ~annot be 
determined even speculatively. 
The witness Fred M. Newson could have and possibl;y 
did see the defendant with the deceased at some time during 
the morning of July 30, 1952 in his store (R. 235, 236). It 
is not claimed that he saw defendant's Cadillac automobile. 
Delbert F. Duncombe did find a partially full bottle 
of Davis whiskey in defendant's apartment (R. 237). Onl;y 
by inference can it be said that this was one of the bottles 
supposedly purchased on July 30, 1952. We think that 
immaterial, it does nothing to establish the time. of purchase. 
William J. Christensen (R. 238, 239, 240). Called a~ 
a witness for defense, Christensen presumed that he wa~ 
called to the Penderville apartment in a professional capac· 
ity as an attorney and he testified that the subject matter~ 
of which he talked with defendant were (a) "* * * m~ 
inquiry about what was the matter and about the lady or 
the floor" (R. 238) ; (b) "* * * in connection witl 
some advice he wanted as to marriage of the lady -bein~ 
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~.the~ 
di , ."bigamous or not" (R. 239) ; (c) that he had no conversa-u ' 
''· tion "relating to the subject matter of this case" since the 
case did not exist then and there was no chance to talk 
~on G.~ about something that did not exist, (R. 239) ; (d) concern-
.' Shai! ing the subject of homicide but not until after the plain-
~~, clothes detectives had arrived and had questioned defend-
:~::.:::: ant (R. 239, 240). This witness had previously been called 
-<::_ as a witness for the State. He had testified as to when 
:- ;;;t~ he was called on the phone by defendant; when he arrived 
:: -~ at the apartment of defendant; what he then observed of 
:.:.-::~ the deceased and the defendant; what occurred while he 
~.: :.::: was thereat. There was nothing in his testimony material 
. -..... -:. ..... 
or otherwise as to what occurred before the hour of eight 
forty-five p. m. on July 30, 1952, nor could there have 
been . 
G. J. Murray, State's witness, testified that he was the 
caretaker for the apartments at 1012 Barbara Place (R. 
166); that there were thirty-nine apartments together 
with from two to six motel rooms (R. 167). That he be-
came acquainted with the defendant on or about the first 
__ day of July and that he rented Apartment No. 2 to the 
:.-.. Pendervilles at that time (R. 167). He described the loca-
-· tion of that apartment with relation to the office and the 
.:.;: :r apartment which he occupied (R. 168) . The witness testi-
fied as to voices or words he had heard emanating from the 
.-~ Penderville apartment during the month of July, that Mr. 
:-.. -~ 
. , · Penderville's voice always seemed to be that of a demand 
:c :aJ: of some kind and that he heard it, after the first two or 
uon ~ three days, every day while they were there (R. 169, 170). 
~y~ This witness then testified that he was either in his apart-
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ment or around the building on the 30th day of July, all 
day (R. 170). He then stated that he was familiar with 
the Penderville's Cadillac automobile, that it was at the 
apartment all that day, parked at a certain place and in a 
certain manner and that it was still in the same place 
when the officers arrived (R. 170, 171). That during the 
day he did not see the defendant at any time and during 
the evening only when he saw the defendant at the phone 
(R. 171, 172). The witness testified that Mr. Penderville 
used the telephone numerous times from 5 p. m. on and fixed 
the time of five o'clock as being when he, the witness, went 
through the office to go to his apartment (R. 172); at five 
thirty o'clock "Because I was eating my dinner" (R. 173); 
at seven thirty because the witness was listening to the 
television (R. 173, 174, 176, 177). The record does show 
some discrepancy in this witness's testimony at the trial, 
as to the time of the telephone calls Mr. Penderville made, 
with the witness's prior testimony at the preliminary hear-
ing (R. 174); however, he had given the matter more 
thought and concentration and he had not talked to anyone 
about it (R. 175). 
The testimony of Mr. Murray as to what he heard or 
observed as to the demeanor. and of the demegoric con-
versations between deceased and defendant was admissible 
to show motive and probable cause for the assault upon 
deceased by the defendant. 
Counsel for appellant makes much ado about nothing 
through pages 60 to 71 of his brief. It is said that defend-
ant "did the normal and logical thing in rinsing out a wash-
cloth in cold water, bathed her face and went back and 
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rinsed the cloth out again and folded it over her forehead 
and then put an ice pack on her head." We submit that it 
would have also been the normal and logical thing for the 
defendant to summon aid, if he had nothing to hide, for 
the deceased. It certainly would have been the humane 
thing to have done. Can it be said that a lawyer was sum-
moned for benefit of the deceased? Finally, we make this 
observation; that is, we cannot conceive that it could be 
in any way material whether the deceased was an alcoholic, 
a drug addict, a bleeder or in good health or in poor health 
insofar as the question of homicide is concerned. If any 
of these conditions existed, the defendant could not but 
have known and would ordinarily have been expected to 
respect the fact. He cannot blame his conduct upon a con-
dition of intoxication, nor does he do so for he said, "In 
my opinion I don't get drunk" (R. 296). Normally, those 
unwell are able to command and to receive the greater at-
tention because of that fact from all with whom they come 
in contact in every segment of an understanding society. 
The jurors brought in their verdict. It was, "We the Jurors 
impaneled in the above .case, find the defendant guilty of 
second degree murder, * * * " 
We submit that there was substantial evidence from 
which the jury could and did reasonably conclude that Edgar 
Ronald Penderville fatally assaulted June Weiler Pender-
ville and that being so, it is not the province of the appel-
~,,~ late court to judge the sufficiency of the evidence; the 
ai; verdict should not be disturbed. State v. Aures, 102 Utah 
11!1 113, 127 P. 2d 872. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM 
J. CHRISTENSEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE 
CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH DEFEND-
ANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE 
WAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PEN-
VERVILLE APARTMENT. 
Attorney Christensen arrived at the Penderville apart-
ment approximately one and one-half hours after the wit-
ness Susan Eliason had heard the noises emanate there-
from. It was never contended that he perceived the inflic-
tion of the deceased's injuries; he, with the defendant, 
between the hour of approximately nine o'clock p. m. and 
nine fifty-five p. m., according to their own testimony, 
calmly and meditatively discussed the affairs of defendant. 
The Utah case, Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 
21, 290 P. 970, is certainly not for application to the factual 
situation with which we are now concerned. The rule, as 
to res gestae, is : 
"The res gestae may include statements, acts 
and conduct of accused after the commission of the 
crime, whether such statements, acts, and conduct of 
the accused are exculpating or incriminatory in 
character or effect, but the statements or acts must 
have been spontaneously made or performed while 
the mind was still under the influence that governed 
it at the time that the event took place, and at such 
a time and place and under such circumstances as 
to exclude the idea of design, fabrication, after-
thought, or a mere retrospective narration of a past 
occurrence." 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 667, 
page 1054. 
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Adopted by our Court in State v. Gardner, 213 P. 794, 
61 u. 359. 
It was not erroneous to permit Christensen to testify 
to those facts which he knew of his own knowledge. But, 
the conversation he had with defendant sought to be elicited 
had all the earmarks of a self serving purpose and was 
therefore inadmissible. It was an attempt through heresay 
evidence to show that defendant's story told at one time 
would corroborate his story told at the trial and thus 
strengthen his testimony before the jury. There was no 
error in sustaining the objections. 
See, State v. Seboldt, 65 Utah 204, 236 P. 225. 
CONCLUSION 
!lid!! We conclude that the judgment and conviction should 
be sustained. 
.Wa! 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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